Authentication is one of the essential tools available for security in WLANs. Access control authentication mechanisms provides entity authentication, access into the network and key evolving for data frames protection. Secure WLAN Authentication Scheme (SWAS) is one such access control authentication mechanism. It provides entity authentication along with per frame authentication. All the participating entities in the scheme i.e. STA, AP and AS authenticate each other. The scheme makes use of cryptographic measure like delegation, key management, encryption and MIC for securing the scheme. The security properties of the scheme need to be validated for effectiveness. In this paper, a formal tool i.e. Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) is used for proving the authentication property of the scheme.
INTRODUCTION
Several kinds of authentication exist in wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) for ex. lightweight authentication, encryption based authentication, certificate based authentication, frame level authentication. In Lightweight authentication shared key is used as a seed value (input value) for Authentication Stream Generator (ASG). ASG generates authentication stream. Few bits are selected as authentication token and used for providing frame authentication by putting them in the frame [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . The lightweight authentication schemes do not consider other aspects of security like privacy, integrity etc. and usually involve synchronization algorithms for synchronizing the two ASGs. Encryption based authentication is considered mainly by Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol. Here, the sender encrypts the data using its shared key while the receiver decrypts the data using its shared key. Decrypting into something meaningful authenticates the sender. WEP has several weaknesses [8] [9] [10] [11] and hence is deprecated. IEEE 802.11i [12] provides certificate based entity authentication. It depends upon 802.1X [13] for entity authentication. 802.1X [13] provides authentication along with the access control. For providing frame level authentication, 802.11i calculates message integrity code (MIC) for each frame using the shared key (PTK) [14] .
Secure WLAN Authentication Scheme (SWAS) proposed at [15] also provides entity authentication similar to 802.11i. It do not use certificate based authentication rather delegation based approach is used [16] [17] . SWAS reduces the process length and complexity of the authentication process. This also decreases the network overload and communication latencies. The scheme ensures atleast the same effect and outcome as that produced jointly by authentication and four way handshake of IEEE 802.11i i.e. it provides STA authentication to AS, derives same number of session keys, maintains PTK freshness and maintains desired security properties. In addition, the scheme provides authentication to all the involved entities i.e. STA, AP, AS. Due to this, attacks like false AP attack where a rogue AP act like genuine AP is not possible. Denial of Service (DoS) attack effect is also reduced by the scheme. The scheme has 4 messages and all the messages are also authenticated by using cryptographic measures like delegation, encryption, MIC and digital signature.
These cryptographic operations involve computations at the AP. It is shown that no extra latencies arise due to increase in computations.
The protocol's security properties need to be validated. Hence, a formal proof is provided for validating its authentication property. In proof, protocol composition logic (PCL) is utilized.
The rest of the paper is divided into 3 sections. Section2 presents an overview of the Secure WLAN Authentication Scheme (SWAS). Section 3 presents proof of the authentication property of SWAS using PCL. Section 4 provides conclusion. Appendix A contains existing rules and formulas used in formal proof. Appendix B provides statements of formal proof of authentication property.
REVIEW OF SECURE WLAN AUTHENTICATION SCHEME (SWAS)
Secure WLAN Authentication Scheme (SWAS) provides both entity authentication and per frame authentication. It has three entities namely wireless station (STA), access point (AP) and authentication server (AS). Four messages are used in the scheme namely M1, M2, M3 and M4.The entities and the messages used are shown in figure 1 . The information not pertaining to the scope of the paper is removed from it. AS authenticates the STA entity and after the authentication is successful, AP provides access to STA into the network. For entity authentication secret key are used. Keys evolved in Table 5 . SWAS invariants used in proving authentication property
FORMAL PROOF OF THE SWAS AUTHENTICATION PROPERTY
The proof utilizes the Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [18] [19] [20] [21] . Appendix A contains existing rules and formulas used in formal proof. PCL is used to represent a protocol by a set of roles (such as "Initiator", "Responder" or "Server"). SWAS has three roles, one for each participants -STA, AP and AS. A role specifies a sequence of actions to be executed by an honest participant (or principal). A principal executing a particular instance of role is referred as a thread. It has a unique session id for each session. : :
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AS Receive X Z X msg digsig  supplicant (it can only receive Msg1 but do not send it). Thus, no principal performs the role of both authenticator and supplicant.  SWAS,3 states that an honest AS do not send Msg1 and Msg4 and hence not act as supplicant or AS.  SWAS,4 and  SWAS,5 are used for stating that only an entity can own its own private key while  SWAS,6 states that σ is shared only by STA and AS. SPMK asserts that only authenticator and supplicant has the PMK.
In this paper, the authentication property (Appendix B) for authenticator (AP) and supplicant (STA) is proved. Proof of authentication property for AS is not shown due to space consideration.
On execution of SWAS, the authenticator can reason as follows:
1. Since authenticator is honest ( [13] [14] . This combined with point(4) above means Message3 is indeed sent by supplicant and this happens before authenticator receives it (line 15-16).
Based Upon these arguments, all the actions are matched in line (17) . Hence, the authenticator can conclude that the security properties of session authentication are met.
On execution of SWAS, the supplicant can reason as follows: 1. Since supplicant is honest, it knows that it receive Message 4 only after it has sent Message 1 previously, represented in line (18) Based upon matching actions in line (26) the supplicant can conclude that the security properties of session authentication are met.
CONCLUSION
Secure WLAN Authentication Scheme (SWAS) achieves secure entity authentication and key generations for achieving secure communication. It utilizes cryptographic measures for improving the security in WLANs. The scheme strives to achieve the desired security properties like authentication, integrity, secrecy, availability, key freshness etc. All its packets are authenticated properly, thus reducing the attack chances. In this paper the authentication property of the SWAS using protocol composition logic (PCL) is proved. As future work, validation of scheme's other properties like secrecy and resistivity to DoS (Denial of Service) attacks will be done. 
